Turning open-access pasture into accountable, contract-based land
58M
Livestock heads in Mongolia (2025)
2.3×
Above optimal carrying capacity
76.9%
Of territory affected by degradation
The core problem
More animals, less income — and no way to stop
Under open access, any herder who reduces their herd simply hands the freed-up pasture to a neighbour. Restraint is punished; overstocking is the only rational move.
Adequate stocking density vs. overstocking — why more animals means less income, not more.
What it is
Not a restriction on nomadic life — a formal boundary around who is accountable
A 15-year contract between a Primary Herder Household Association and the Soum Governor. It defines seasonal pasture boundaries, aligns livestock numbers with carrying capacity, and replaces open-access grazing with an accountable, contract-based system.
Delineates seasonal pasture boundaries
Obligates herders to balance livestock with carrying capacity
Does not restrict nomadic movement — protects rights to 4-season pastures and reserve lands
How it works — establishing a PUA, 5 steps
From soum-level area designation to signed agreement — herders and government share every step.
Soum Government establishes areas for introducing PUAs, in accordance with local development policies
Herders decide group memberships, identify group boundaries, consult neighbors, and submit a proposal to the bagh meeting
The bagh meeting discusses the proposal; the Soum Land Officer reviews for boundary overlaps and submits to the Soum Governor, who signs the PUA
Herders undertake activities to reconcile livestock numbers with pasture carrying capacity, by increasing animal sales and improving livestock quality
The Soum Land Officer, Agricultural Unit staff, and State Environmental Inspector jointly monitor implementation
The evidence
5-year outcome: herd-maximizing vs. PUA (Arkhangai aimag)
Indicator
Herd-max
PUA
Livestock change (5 yr)
+27.6%
−22.6%
Cash income / HH (5 yr)
+2.8%
+47%
Income per sheep-unit
−15.4%
+97.2%
Overgrazing rate (Year 5)
595%
325%
HH cash income (₮M)
13.7→14.1
13.7→20.1
Source: CPR herd turnover model, NSO data — average soum, Arkhangai aimag.
24M sheep today ≈ 14M sheep under a PUA — same national income, far less pasture pressure. Fewer animals — more income.
Pilot results: participants vs. non-participants (livestock reduction)
Program
Participants
Non-part.
Diff.
ENSURE (UNDP/GEF) — 13 soums, 2019–23
−18.2%
−11.1%
7.1pp
ADAPT (UNDP/GCF) — 4 aimags, 2022–24
−25%
−4%
20.6pp
ADB Pilot — cooperative-based, 2019–22
−21.4%
−5.6%
15.8pp
A note on verification: herd-count figures above are drawn from NSO's end-of-year livestock census, based largely on herders' own oral reporting — sufficient to demonstrate the pattern shown here, but not yet the continuous, evidence-backed record carbon markets require. Component 5 (Green Loans) proposes a birth-to-death animal registry plus herder app as a more verifiable upgrade to this same data source.
Why it sticks
Building an "ownership mentality"
Households that sign a PUA behave differently toward the land — because the incentive structure changed, not just the rules.
Only leaseholders benefit from protection — creating the incentive to invest in pasture quality
Enforceable accountability for overgrazing and degradation
Boundary size is what makes this work or fail in practice. If a PUA boundary is drawn too large — covering many unrelated households — non-member households can still graze inside it during whichever season the agreement doesn't specifically restrict, and some signing members end up wintering outside the boundary altogether. Once that happens, no single signing household can be fairly held accountable, and enforcement collapses even though the agreement still exists on paper. Small, kinship- or friendship-based groups avoid this: their boundaries map onto households that already know and trust each other.
That same trust base is why small groups can actually hit the 5% annual reduction target while larger ones struggle to. The target is set and assessed at the group level, not household by household. A household with under roughly 200 head has little room to reduce further, so wealthier members cut more and carry the group's target — small, tight-knit groups already run informal mutual-support norms that let them absorb an uneven reduction burden.
In small, close-knit herder groups, members negotiate flexibly — a wealthier herder can reduce more on behalf of a poorer household — making the 5% annual reduction target achievable collectively.
The upside
PUA compliance unlocks premium organic markets
Pasture-raised livestock within carrying capacity naturally qualifies as organic — no antibiotics, no residues, rotational grazing. That opens export markets where demand outstrips supply.
Market
Conventional
Organic
Premium
USA (per kg)
$11
$17.40
+58%
China — Beijing (per kg)
$10.70
$15.00
+40%
Russia — major cities (per kg)
$11–15
$20–38
+80–150%
Source: CPR market survey data. US market: $80B total, 12M tonnes/yr — 3% organic share alone (360K tonnes) exceeds Mongolia's total current meat export capacity.
Key requirement: organic standards (China GB/T 19630, IFOAM) explicitly require livestock numbers within carrying capacity. PUA compliance IS the organic certification requirement.
Legal foundation & climate co-benefit
Already anchored in law
Law on Herders (2024)
Law on Herder Household Associations
Amendments to the Land Law
CPR delivered national PUA regulations & templates to MOFALI (2025)
Adaptation and mitigation, together
Adaptation — builds herder resilience to drought and dzud through secured pasture access and reserve lands
Poor herders with fewer animals — the 5% reduction target is set at group level, not per household; wealthier members can reduce more, letting poorer households even grow within the group quota
Wealthy herders with large herds — existing herd size and pasture use are taken as baseline; rights formally protected, can't be arbitrarily revoked
Border-zone and highly mobile herders — cross-boundary cases resolved through inter-soum coordination; guaranteed reserve-pasture access in drought or dzud emergencies
The public interest — less overgrazing means better food security, lower urban meat/dairy prices, lower emissions, protected land assets for future generations
Who loses — and why that's good governance: officials who arbitrarily allocate pasture for personal gain; "informal powerful" herders who expand at neighbours' expense; mining and tourism operators treating pasture as a free resource; absentee urban livestock owners grazing on others' land without accountability.
Converting these "winners" into rule-followers — and "losers" into protected rights-holders — is precisely what good governance means.
